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Evidential Diversity and the Triangulation
of Phenomena
Jaakko Kuorikoski and Caterina Marchionni*y
The article argues for the epistemic rationale of triangulation, namely, the use of multiple
and independent sources of evidence. It claims that triangulation is to be understood as
causal reasoning from data to phenomenon, and it rationalizes its epistemic value in terms
of controlling for likely errors and biases of particular data-generating procedures. This
perspective is employed to address objections against triangulation concerning the falli-
bility and scope of the inference, as well as problems of independence, incomparability,
and discordance of evidence. The debate on the existence of social preferences is used as
an illustrative case.
1. Introduction. Approaching the phenomenon of interest from diverse per-
spectives and using multiple methods to investigate it is often referred to as
triangulation. Although it is a term routinely used by scientists ðsee Blaikie
1991; Hammersley 2008Þ and sometimes also by philosophers ðsee Wimsatt
1981; Schickore and Coko 2013Þ, there is no agreed-on deﬁnition of what it
amounts to or a shared understanding of the basis of its epistemic value. The
idea of the epistemic virtue of using diverse evidence to increase the con-
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ﬁrmation of hypotheses is intuitively plausible—even taken as a trivial truism
by many—and yet the concept remains ambiguous and contested. In meth-
odological discussions in the social sciences and recently also in the phi-
losophy of science, formidable criticism has been leveled against the usability
of triangulation. Furthermore, those who agree on the epistemic importance
of diversity of evidence disagree about what exactly this value is based on. In
this article, we propose an account of the epistemic rationale of triangulation
as a form of robustness reasoning. That is, we understand triangulation as the
use of multiple and independent sources of evidence to ascertain whether a
phenomenon is an artifact of a particular method of determination ðCampbell
and Fiske 1959;Wimsatt 1981Þ. This notion of triangulation is closely related
to that of evidential diversity, but although the conﬁrmational signiﬁcance of
evidential diversity is a widely accepted epistemic principle ðe.g., Fitelson
2001Þ, several worries about triangulation have been voiced. For example,
Stegenga ð2009Þ claims that triangulation faces several difﬁculties that limit
its epistemic value: evidence produced with different methods is often in-
comparable, a criterion of independence is needed but is not available, tri-
angulation does not always work as a conﬁrmatory procedure, and multiple
methods often yield results that are incongruent. Hudson ð1999, 2009, 2013Þ
claims that triangulation has no epistemic value and that despite occasional
allegations to the contrary, scientists do not actually make use of it.
We address these and other worries and show that they arise from either
too narrow or too broad a conception of the methodology of triangulation.
We propose that in order to adequately assess the epistemic import of trian-
gulation, two types of evidential reasoning need to be distinguished: data-to-
phenomenon inferences and phenomenon-to-theory inferences ðBogen and
Woodward 1988Þ. In the standard fashion, by ‘phenomena’ is here meant
robust and ðat least partiallyÞ replicable results, effects, or regularities. Phe-
nomena are ðusuallyÞ not directly observable but must be inferred from data.
Theories explain and are tested by phenomena, and the existence of phe-
nomena is inferred from data. The two types of inference are different: the ﬁrst
type of inference concerns the deductive ðor broadly logicalÞ relationship be-
tween a representational system ða theoryÞ and a description of a phenome-
non,whereas the latter concerns the reliability of the causal processes bywhich
the data are generated.
We argue that triangulation is to be understood as a methodological strat-
egy employed for the purpose of controlling for errors and biases of particular
methods of determination. The notion of error control here is epistemic, not
concrete: independent experimental procedures or kinds of evidence can be
used to increase the ‘aggregate’ reliability of data-to-phenomenon inferences.
These inferences concern the causal processes generating the evidence. In
the triangulation of phenomena, what we need to worry about are errors and
biases in the particular processes at play. Accordingly, the relevant notion of
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independence is that of ðcausalÞ reliability independence, which does not
require knowledge of all the background assumptions, as is ðarguablyÞ re-
quired for the conﬁrmational boost that explaining or predicting a variety of
phenomena confers to a theory. Reliability independence is established on a
case-by-case basis and does not pose any general in-principle issue of incom-
parability of evidence. Furthermore, in data-to-phenomenon inferences, the
conﬁrmational added value of triangulation can be captured by the probabi-
listic condition of conﬁrmational independence, closely related to the causal
screening-off condition.We illustrate our claimswith an example drawn from
the behavioral sciences: the use of behavioral, psychological, and neuro-
logical data as allegedly diverse evidence in support of the existence of social
preferences.
2. Triangulation as a Robustness Argument. In broad terms, triangulation
can be understood as the use of multiple perspectives to gain a more compre-
hensive understanding of something. Here we endorse Campbell and Fiske’s
ð1959Þ narrower deﬁnition of triangulation as the use of multiple methods to
measure or detect the same property or phenomenon. So deﬁned, triangu-
lation is a form of robustness analysis: although each of the multiple methods
is a source of possible error, if the same inference is drawn regardless of
which error liable method is used, then the errors of the methods used prob-
ably do not matter to the inference at stake. This sense of triangulation is to
be distinguished from other ways in which diverse evidence may be episte-
mically useful, such as providing novel information about the phenomenon
under investigation and thus increasing overall understanding, providing evi-
dence that some particular method is reliable ðsee sec. 4.6Þ, consilience of
inductions or uniﬁcation in the sense that a hypothesis explaining a diverse set
of phenomena by itself increases its conﬁrmation, and determining that the
phenomenon itself is causally robust under diverse disturbances and back-
ground conditions. Our interest is only in the epistemic added value that di-
verse and independent sources of evidence provide for a single hypothesis
ðabout the same property of the phenomenon under investigationÞ.
In order to properly locate our analysandum, it is worthmaking a few initial
observations concerning robustness analysis in general. First, robustness
analysis has recently been the focus of sustained philosophical attention, but
different bodies of literature refer to rather different practices under the gen-
eral category of robustness analysis ðe.g., Wimsatt 1981; Weisberg 2006;
Woodward 2006; Stegenga 2009; Soler et al. 2012; Hey 2015Þ.1 According
1. For example, Woodward ð2006Þ distinguishes ﬁve types of robustness analysis. His
notion ofmeasurement robustness is the one that comes the closest to our characterization
of triangulation, but whereas the former focuses on measurement procedures ðnamely,
assigning numerical values to quantitiesÞ, we are interested in the establishment of the
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to some, a common rationale undergirds various forms of robustness analysis
ðe.g., Wimsatt 1981; Schupbach 2015Þ. However, others argue that infer-
ences that are legitimate on the basis of one kind of robustness may not be
so in terms of another. Our view is that even if various forms of robustness
analysis did share a common broad rationale, identifying such a rationale
would not as such sufﬁce to yield the conditions under which robustness-
based scientiﬁc inferences are legitimate. In other words, there are two dis-
tinct philosophical projects: one is to identify at an abstract level the logic
behind successful robustness arguments, while the other is to determine what
is required for a speciﬁc form of robustness analysis to be successful. This
article is a contribution to the latter project.
Second, critics of robustness analysis sometimes argue as if to establish
that robustness analysis has little or no epistemic value, it is sufﬁcient to
demonstrate that it can fail to deliver the truth. However, robustness anal-
ysis should not be regarded as a procedure for conclusively establishing the
truth of a result, a hypothesis, or a theory but rather one aimed at increasing
the reliability of inferences from less than perfectly reliable scientiﬁc tools.
Consequently, triangulation is a heuristic that should be expected to work
well in a certain class of cases yet is neither necessary nor sufﬁcient for
establishing truth ðWimsatt 2007Þ. Thus, the challenge is to identify the cir-
cumstances in which conﬁdence in the result rationally increases on the basis
of the concordance between independent methods of determination.2
Third, robustness analysis has been thought to be an instance of a no-
miracles argument ðe.g., Hudson 2013Þ. This association has been possibly
inspired by the use of the robust determination of Avogadro’s constant as an
argument for the molecular theory of matter as a paradigm case of triangu-
lation reasoning. We argue, however, that this is misleading. First, interpret-
ing the ‘no-miracles argument’ as an inference to the best explanation is sub-
ject to the quite obvious objection that if all the methods of determination are
wrong, the explanation of their agreement might be due not to the truth of the
result but to their sharing a common mistaken assumption ðsee also Salmon
1984; Cartwright 1991Þ. Second, the very idea of a substantial inference to the
best explanation is highly suspect. In order to identify when conﬁdence in a
conclusion is justiﬁably increased, we have to go beyond the intuitive no-
miracles argument. This is what we endeavor to do in the following sections.
2. We are not committed to a fully Bayesian view of scientiﬁc reasoning and of the
aims of inquiry, however, but only to the broad idea that it makes sense to discuss
comparative weighing of evidence. The latter is a necessary condition for triangulation
and related heuristics.
reality of ðmainly experimentalÞ phenomena more generally. Likewise, Schickore and
Coko ð2013Þ use the term triangulation to refer to “the use in empirical practice of
multiple means of investigation to validate an experimental outcome” ð296Þ.
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3. Evidential Diversity and Data-to-Phenomenon Inferences. The ﬁrst
building block of our account of triangulation is the conﬁrmational inde-
pendence of diverse evidence. One can formulate this independence con-
dition probabilistically:
E1 and E2 are conﬁrmationally independent with respect to a hypothesis H
if and only if the amount of conﬁrmation ðgiven one’s choice of measureÞ
provided to H by E1 is independent of E2 and vice versa ðcðH, E1|E2Þ 5
cðH, E1Þ and cðH, E2|E1Þ 5 cðH, E2ÞÞ. A sufﬁcient condition for conﬁr-
mational independence is that E1 and E2 are probabilistically independent
conditional on H ðor not HÞ ðE1┴E2 | HÞ, but dependent unconditionally
ði.e., H screens off E1 and E2; Sober 1989; Fitelson 2001Þ.
This means that, given that the result is known ðin the binary case, that the
hypothesis is true or falseÞ, whether one means of providing evidence pro-
duces the ‘right’ result does not affect the probability of the other getting it
right. If this holds, the conﬁrmation provided by the different methods is
independent of each other. Such multiple independent pieces of evidence
provide additional conﬁrmation to the hypothesis, over and above the indi-
vidual pieces of evidence. This is a relatively robust principle in line with
what we take to be plausible candidates for theories of degree of evidential
support ðsuch as Bayesianism, with likelihood ratio as the measure of con-
ﬁrmational support, and likelihoodismÞ.3 Rather than diversity per se, it is this
independence condition that grounds the conﬁrmatory added value of a variety
of evidence ðFitelson 2001; see, however, Bovens and Hartmann 2002Þ.
As such, however, the formal conﬁrmational independence condition does
not determine what the probabilities are attached to and, consequently, how
the independence is and should be realized in practice. The second building
block of our account of triangulation addresses this issue. We argue that in-
sofar as triangulation pertains to data-to-phenomenon inferences, which are
essentially causal inferences, then there is a rather intuitive way to see how
independence can be realized, one that, as we will show, blocks many of the
criticisms leveled against triangulation as a robustness argument.
In the vein of Bogen and Woodward’s account, data-to-phenomena infer-
ences are causal inferences in the sense that they involve empirical reasoning
about the particular causal processes that generate the data and their possible
errors as well as the experimental manipulation of the phenomenon of interest
ðBogen and Woodward 1988; Woodward 2000Þ. Hence, the evidential rele-
3. A similar principle can also be rationalized in the severe testing framework, but
strictly speaking, any discussion of degree of support would then be out of place. Staley
ð2004Þ rationalizes the value of triangulation within a severe testing framework. We
discuss the relationship of Staley’s and our accounts in sec. 4.6.
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vance of data to phenomena cannot be informatively reconstructed solely as a
set of entailment relations between theoretical and observational sentences.
The establishment of deductive relations between phenomena and data claims
is at least not necessary for the evidential relevance of the latter: scientiﬁc
practice shows that the evidential status of data does not require full theoretical
knowledge of the principles of the data-generating processes.4
Next, we argue that if triangulation pertains to data-to-phenomenon in-
ferences, the required screening-off condition, and consequent conﬁrma-
tional independence, is satisﬁed when the different methods producing the
data ðsay, E1 and E2Þ do not share any systematic errors and biases. This
means that, with respect to causal inferences from data to phenomena, con-
ﬁrmational independence is realized by what Schupbach ð2015Þ calls reli-
ability independence ði.e., that the characteristic biases and errors of the
different methods are independentÞ. To see this, consider ða property ofÞ a
phenomenon investigated by twomethods. The methods are used to produce
data ðevidenceÞ about the phenomenon such that systematic patterns in the
data track the property of the phenomenon. The property is therefore a com-
mon cause of the two types of evidence. Let us think of this in terms of ran-
dom variables forming a conjunctive fork.5 Since the methods are not fully
reliable, this conjunctive fork is noisy—one can think of this in the standard
way as additional error terms added to the evidence variables. The phenom-
enon variable screens off the evidence variables if these error terms are inde-
pendent.We can now distinguish two reasons why such independence should
be expected to hold. First, if the processes of data production ðmethodsÞ are
causally independent ðbeing based on different kinds of causal mechanismsÞ,
then any token random causal disturbance of one method should not have
an effect on the other method. Second, if the methods are based on different
kinds of causal processes, the presence of any systematic error ðbiasÞ in one
method should not affect the probability of an error occurring in the other.
Thus, if the methods are not prone to similar disturbances ðerrorsÞ and sys-
tematic biases, the error terms are independent of each other, in which case
the conjunctive fork realizes the conﬁrmational independence condition. Thus,
conﬁrmational independence is realized by reliability independence.
How do scientists know whether the methods or instruments share the
same error, so that their agreement constitutes a reliable basis for triangu-
lation? In causal data-to-phenomenon inferences, the epistemic task is to dis-
tinguish signal from noise and to control for biases and errors in the causal
4. We take causal reasoning to be essentially characterized by the interventionist theory
ðPearl 2000; Woodward 2003Þ, although none of the central steps in our argument de-
pend on the details of that theory.
5. Of course, this means accepting the principle of common cause.
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production of the data. Such causal inferences take into account the process
that produced the data, which involves a number of context-dependent con-
siderations ðBogen and Woodward 1988; Woodward 2000Þ.6 Likewise, tri-
angulation should take into account context-dependent considerations about
the particular processes that produce the data and their common ðas well as
differentÞ sources of possible errors. Moreover, the fact that triangulation
concerns a comparison between particular causal processes means that two
or more processes of data production being independent in the relevant way
depends on what we are trying to detect or measure. Thus, two ðor moreÞ
methods may be independent in providing evidence for P but not for P*. For
example, different brain-imaging techniques ðsuch as fMRI andMEGÞ can be
relatively independent with respect to measurements of brain area activation
because they rely on different types of physical processes ðfMRI tracks blood
oxygenation, whereas MEG directly tracks the minute currents produced in
neuronal communicationÞ but dependent when taken as methods of determin-
ing cognitive function ðbecause as means of detecting speciﬁc cognitive func-
tions, they rely on the same localization hypothesesÞ.
Second, agreement of results is necessary for successful triangulation, but
it is not sufﬁcient. It is independence with respect to types of error that
matters. The identiﬁcation of errors occurs via local empirical investigation,
that is, bymeans of replication, calibration, and similar strategies well known
to scientists ðsee Woodward 2000Þ. There are cases in which scientists have
enough knowledge of their experimental and measuring apparatuses to be
quite conﬁdent about the independence of errors that need to be controlled
for. In these cases, the inference is quite strong. In other cases, more empirical
investigation is required regarding the probability of errors that the particular
experimental apparatuses may encounter in relation to the detection of the
property or phenomenon at hand. The more empirical ðexperimentalÞ or the-
oretical reasons there are to suspect that the different methods might share
relevant errors and biases, the less conﬁdence one should have that the con-
vergence of results is due to the phenomenon rather than the shared errors.
This also means that whether one method produces the result will have a
bearing on the probability that the other method produces the result, given
knowledge of the phenomena they are both measuring. Consequently, con-
ﬁrmation provided by onemethod is also less independent of the conﬁrmation
provided by the other. The epistemic added value of triangulation comes in
degrees, and full reliability, and hence conﬁrmational, independence should
be taken as the ideal limiting case.
6. Woodward ð2000Þ characterizes them as ‘empirical’ inferences in contrast to the ‘logical’
inferences that are emphasized the most in the context of theory conﬁrmation, although of
course not all methods of theory conﬁrmation are based on logical inference alone.
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It is only once a phenomenon is inferred to be robust ði.e., a ‘real phe-
nomenon’ and not an artifactÞ that our theories are expected to be able to
account for it ðsee Campbell and Fiske 1959; Bogen and Woodward 1988Þ.
Whatever one’s preferred method of conﬁrmation and theory testing, it can
be argued that ‘accounting for the phenomenon’ provides conﬁrmation to
a theory. If it is hypothetico-deductivism, then the relevant relationship is one
of deductive implication. If a Bayesian theory of conﬁrmation, then it is a mat-
ter of appropriate subjective probabilistic conditional dependencies ðJeffrey
conditionalization could be used to show how the probability of a theory
increases when the probability of a phenomenon claim is increased via tri-
angulationÞ.7 Something like the logic of severe testing is also applicable:
theories are best conﬁrmed by the kinds of phenomena that would be ðgiven
background knowledge and rival theoriesÞ very unlikely to exist if the theory
were false. We need not commit to any of these views about theory conﬁr-
mation here, however. What matters for our purposes is that the relationship
between theory and phenomenon is not a causal one and, therefore, that the
ideas of error control and the independence of phenomena have to be inter-
preted differently.
4. Six Objections to Triangulation. We have laid out the bare bones of an
account of triangulation as causal reasoning from data to phenomenon, the
epistemic rationale of which lies in controlling for likely errors and biases of
particular data-generating procedures. In the limiting case in which different
methods are based on completely independent causal processes, the methods
do not share any errors and biases and are, as a result, conﬁrmationally in-
dependent.We now show that on this understanding of triangulation,many of
the worries that have been voiced against it turn out to be unfounded.
4.1. Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right. The ﬁrst line of skepticism
against the value of triangulation claims that the very possibility that mul-
tiple incorrect methods may nonetheless produce a congruent result speaks
against the epistemic value of triangulation ðe.g., Cartwright 1991; Hudson
1999, 2009, 2013Þ. In an elaboration of this criticism, Hudson ð2013Þ at-
tempts to show that historical cases of robustness reasoning can be better
rationalized as aimed at checking the reliability of a primarymethod by other
methods, a procedure Hudson considers as ‘calibration’. The general argu-
ment is that if one method is reliable, then we do not need other methods, but
if no method is reliable, then we do not gain anything by adding more bad
methods on top of existing bad ones. In our account, triangulation is a matter
of degree of support. As long as the methods are at least approximately in-
7. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this.
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dependent, the claims that multiple ðless than perfectÞ methods do not pos-
sess any value and that adding methods alongside a reliable one does not
increase overall reliability are simply false.
4.2. Independence. A second source of skepticism focuses on the very
possibility of individuating methods of data generation and establishing their
independence. Stegenga ð2009, 2012Þ proposes deﬁning distinctness and
independence in terms of problematic-auxiliary assumptions: two methods
of determination are distinct and independent when their problematic aux-
iliary assumptions are independent relative to a given hypothesis: “A hy-
pothesis is more likely to be true when two or more modes of evidence
provide concordant multimodal evidence and the worrisome or problematic
assumptions for all modes of evidence are independent of each other”
ðStegenga 2012, 219Þ. We assume that by ‘independence’ Stegenga means
that the assumptions can be true or false independently of each other. Al-
though this is in line with the general epistemic rationale of the variety of
evidence principle, Stegenga ﬁnds it problematic that in applying such ro-
bustness arguments we do not know how to identify the problematic as-
sumptions. Therefore, what he calls the ‘problem of individuation’ is shifted
back from having a general criterion for identifying methods to having one
for identifying problematic background assumptions.
Stegenga’s requirement, however, is unnecessarily demanding, both in re-
quiring that all background assumptions be controlled for and that a general
criterion of identiﬁcation exists. It is unclear why we need to know that all the
assumptions underlying each method of determination are independent ðsee
also Claveau 2011, 243Þ. If conﬁdence in a result is a matter of degree, then it
ought to depend on the number and, more importantly, the types of assump-
tions that are independent. As we have seen above, in data-to-phenomenon
inferences, learning about independent reliability is an empirical matter. Of
course, in most cases not all sources of error are known and controlled for.
But does this undermine the epistemic value of triangulation? It does not. Even
if we take near certainty to require the triangulation of a result through as
many methods as there are problematic assumptions or possible sources of
errors, incremental increases can be achieved with less than this ðsee Kuor-
ikoski, Lehtinen, and Marchionni 2010, 2012; Odenbaugh and Alexandrova
2011Þ.
Second, why should there be a general criterion for identifying prob-
lematic assumptions? In principle, it is possible to learn empirically about
whether particular processes of data production are independent and whether
they share the same sources of systematic biases and errors ðe.g., by cali-
brating them to an already established phenomenon or by manipulating other
factors known to affect the phenomenon and checking whether the data-
generating processes produce suitable systematic variationÞ. These empirical
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investigations do not provide us with a general criterion for identifying prob-
lematic assumptions but contextual knowledge about which assumptions are
more likely to matter. In practice, theoretical arguments for and against inde-
pendence of methods are usually presented, but in many cases there is only in-
complete, or even completely wrongheaded, theoretical understanding about
why the detection methods work as they do ðsee, e.g., Hacking’s discussion
of the history of the microscope ½1983, chap. 11Þ. For example, the reliability
of what has now become the true workhorse of cognitive neuroscience, fMRI,
was long held to be suspect because of incomplete theoretical understand-
ing of the physical basis of the BOLD signal and its detection. What ﬁnally
convinced the brain research community of the reliability of the method was
not any breakthrough in the theoretical understanding of the underlying
physics but the experimental establishment of a reliable connection between
the direct electrical stimulation of a macaque brain and the resulting fMRI
images. The important point is that the very nature of the problem of iden-
tifying background assumptions changes when triangulation is investigated
in the context of causal reasoning from data to phenomenon.
4.3. The Screening-Off Condition. Hudson offers the following re-
ductio argument against the probabilistic conﬁrmational independence con-
dition that we favor. If knowing the true value of the property being deter-
mined by the independent methods screens off the probabilities of the outputs
of the methods, then knowing the true value ought to screen off one mea-
surement produced by one method from another produced by the very same
method. In other words, if it is independence rather than variety that is re-
sponsible for the increase in conﬁrmation ðas we claimÞ, then one should be
able to triangulate with only one method, provided that the outputs are suit-
ably independent. And triangulating with one method is surely nonsensical
ðHudson 2013, 18–20Þ.
We agree that if the conﬁrmational independence condition holds, one
can triangulate with only one method. But that is a big if. The condition in
effect demands that the information conveyed by the different observations
is, well, independent. The only way that successive outputs of a single method
can satisfy this condition is that every output provides genuinely new infor-
mation about the target. In our account, the purely formal conﬁrmational in-
dependence condition is fulﬁlled when the different methods qua causal pro-
cesses do not share the same errors and biases: whether one method produces
a ‘faithful’ mark of the target is independent of the success of the other. If
successive applications of one and the same method were independent in this
way, either the method would actually be free of systematic errors ðunbiasedÞ
or each application of the method would somehow constitute a different kind
of causal process sharing no biases with the other applications. In the ﬁrst
case, simply repeating the use of the same method would in fact be the epi-
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stemically rational thing to do. For example, consider the simple case of de-
termining a population statistic, such as the mean: genuinely independent and
unbiased samples are the best means of determining the statistic, and adding
variety to the methods of determination would only be counterproductive. In
the second case ði.e., each application would constitute a different kind of
causal process sharing no biases with the other applicationsÞ, it is hard to see
how the different observations could be said to have been produced by the
same method.
Schupbach ð2015Þ also argues against the conﬁrmational independence
condition. Unlike Hudson, who challenges the sufﬁciency of the screening-
off condition, Schupbach questions its plausibility in practice: the results of
different methods are rarely ðif everÞ going to be fully independent con-
ditional on the negation of the hypothesis, since there are always other
possible reasons for the results to be dependent. Schupbach considers the
case of the observation of Brownian motion. He points out that observ-
ing motion in different types of pollen does not satisfy the conﬁrmational
independence condition, since the common result ðspontaneous motion of
the particlesÞ could be plausibly caused by some other shared features of
the methods, such as a vital force inherent in the pollen or some artifact of the
shared suspension medium. Since learning about the reliability of the exper-
iment with one type of pollen is relevant to the assessment of the reliability of
experiments employing other types of pollen, the results are not independent
conditional on the negation of the Brownian motion hypothesis. Hence,
Schupbach’s argument goes, in this paradigmatic case of robustness rea-
soning ðand in others such as the Lotka-Volterra modelsÞ the conﬁrmational
independence condition does not capture the relevant kind of independence.
In turn, this casts doubts on whether conﬁrmational independence is the right
descriptive account of robustness reasoning in science.
Schupbachmakes an important point here, but the problem is not as severe
as he suggests in the case of causal inferences about phenomena. Data are
evidence of a phenomenon if variation in the data systematically tracks
variation in some aspect of the phenomenon due ðonlyÞ to the causal process
that generates the data. Therefore, the negation of the hypothesis does not
include the whole set of logical possibilities consistent with the phenomenon
not being present. The results only need to be independent with respect to a
set of plausible common causes ðconfoundersÞ capable of producing the
kind of variation that could bemistaken to be caused by the phenomenon.8 In
the pollen example, surely the suspected vital force could create the kind
of variation that could be mistaken for the effect of random molecular col-
8. As an extreme example, the presence of oxygen would be tracked by any two
experiments because of the scientists’ need of oxygen. Nevertheless, oxygen in this
trivial sense is not usually taken as a serious confounder in experimental practice.
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lision, but varying only the type of pollen implies that only the possible errors
related to the speciﬁc kind of particle are being controlled for. Therefore,
although varying the type of pollen certainly is an example of robustness
reasoning, it is not a paradigmatic case of triangulation, which aims at inde-
pendence with respect to asmany relevant causal features of the different data-
generating processes as possible as ameans to control for all possible ðesp. yet-
unknownÞ errors. The whole arsenal of types of observation and experiment
used by Perrin in determiningAvogadro’s number better exempliﬁes the logic
of triangulation.
According to Schupbach’s positive proposal, the rationale of robustness
analysis lies in the efﬁciency with which independent methods eliminate
salient alternative explanations of the observed phenomena. In the previous
example, the different pollens are ‘eliminatively diverse’ in that they rule
out the possibility that the result is due to the form of a particular type of
pollen. Although full reliability independence is not satisﬁed in this case,
there are nevertheless important similarities between our and Schupbach’s
accounts. First, according to our account of triangulation, the observed phe-
nomena are the congruent data produced by the different methods, and the
salient competing explanations for the observed results are precisely the
characteristic errors and biases of particular methods. Second, when full con-
ﬁrmational independence is satisﬁed, all alternative causes of the convergence
of the results are in fact ruled out.9 Hence, triangulation also works by elimi-
nating the biases and errors of particular methods from the list of salient causes
of the observed results. Third, in cases of failure of robustness, the kind of
eliminative reasoning exempliﬁed by varying only a particular aspect of the
data-generating process ðe.g., the type of pollenÞ is more informative since it
allows scientists to locate the source of the error. Schupbach’s eliminativist
account is therefore not a competing alternative: both piecemeal eliminative
robustness analysis and triangulation are forms of robustness reasoning, but
they are still different epistemic strategies.
4.4. Incomparability. The incompatibility of ontologies is a common
argument against the feasibility of triangulation in the social sciences ðsee
Blaikie 1991Þ. Stegenga ð2012Þ points to a similar problem: if the data are
produced with methods based on completely different kinds of causal pro-
cesses and relying on different ðand possibly mutually inconsistentÞ back-
9. In our view, Schupbach’s eliminativist rationale for robustness analysis is in fact at
least compatible with the probabilistic rationale for the epistemic added value of diversity
provided by conﬁrmational independence. As Fitelson puts it, the core idea captured by
the condition is that the advantage of diversity arises from “data whose conﬁrmational
power is maximal, given the evidence we already have” ð2001, 131Þ. Whether the con-
dition quantitatively captures the very same epistemic gain as eliminative diversity has to
be left for further research.
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ground assumptions, then how can the data be about the same phenomenon?
Getting different kinds of data to speak meaningfully with each other is
usually not a trivial task, and some skepticism toward triangulation is war-
ranted when insufﬁcient care has been taken to ensure that interesting in-
ferences can be justiﬁably drawn from collating diverse data. In our under-
standing of triangulation, however, there need not be any tight conceptual
‘mapping’, such as deducibility, or some kind of theoretical reduction be-
tween the ontologies of the phenomenon and the data.What is needed is only
ðpreferably controlledÞ covariation between the different kinds of evidence
and plausible background theories concerning the causal processes between
the phenomenon and the data. Again, the experimental demonstration of the
ability of fMRI to track neural activity shows that experimental control of
the target system can compensate for the lack of theoretical mapping between
the different methods and the target phenomenon: wiggle the target ðpossibly
a more easily accessible surrogate system, like the monkey brainÞ, and if the
different methods produce correlating outcomes, we have a ðdefeasibleÞ rea-
son to believe that they track the same property.
4.5. Discordance. Even though by deﬁnition triangulation requires the
results of different methods to be congruent, sometimes there are results that
seem to point elsewhere than themajority. So is triangulation futile whenever
there is an indication of discordance among the plethora of methods? Ac-
cording to Stegenga ð2009, 2012Þ, when different methods produce discor-
dant rather than concordant evidence, it seems that there would have to be
some way of comparatively evaluating the weight of individual pieces of evi-
dence for triangulation to rationally increase our conﬁdence about the hy-
pothesis. In turn, this would require us to know the ‘amalgamation function’
for the separate pieces of evidence, and it is quite obvious that we are rarely
in possession of such a function. Without a rational way of comparatively
weighing evidence, so the argument goes, appeals to triangulation amount to
no more than hand-waving. However, even if, as seems likely, cases of dis-
cordant evidence occur more frequently than cases of concordant evidence,
discordance does not pose an insurmountable problem for triangulation.
In principle, the epistemic rationale of triangulation works just as well
when some of the evidence independently lowers the probability of the
hypothesis; the problem is evaluating the extent to which the discordant
evidence matters. On one hand, Stegenga is right in that we are rarely in a
position to provide a full amalgamation function for all of the evidence, so the
lesson of discordance is that in such cases, we should only be as conﬁdent in
the implications of the robustness of the result as we are conﬁdent about the
relative differences we assign to the reliability and weight of the different
evidence. On the other hand, if we have no principled way of making such
comparisons, we should not be talking about increasing or decreasing degrees
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of support in the ﬁrst place. In such cases, the only rational thing to conclude
from discordance is that something is amiss and hence that it is rational to
suspend any judgment on the hypothesis—at least for the time being ðHey
2015Þ. But if we cannot assign any differences to evidential weight to begin
with—and implicit equal weighing is weighing nonetheless—triangulation
does not make any sense, regardless of discordance.
4.6. Security and Reliability. The main competing rationalizations for
what at the outset seems like triangulation appeal to the use of independent
methods to increase the reliability of a primary method, which, in the end, is
the one providing the evidence for the hypothesis. According to Staley
ð2004Þ, rather than directly increasing the evidential support ð‘strength’Þ of
a hypothesis, the main role of triangulation is to increase the ‘security’ of
a primary evidential claim, that is, “the degree to which ½a claim ½about
particular data being evidence for a hypothesis is susceptible to defeat from
the failure of an auxiliary assumption” ð468Þ.10 Hudson ð2013Þ also argues
that in the historical episodes that philosophers ðand scientists, for that matterÞ
have identiﬁed as instances of robustness reasoning, including Perrin’s much
celebrated determination of Avogadro’s number, robustness reasoning was
not in fact involved and that the function of multiple ways of measurement
was just to test the reliability of the primarymethod. Is there a principledway
of keeping triangulation apart from tests of procedures, or do the two con-
ﬁrmatory effects—the one for the reliability of methods and the one for the
phenomenon—amount to the same thing after all?
According to Staley ð2004Þ, convergent results can increase the security
of an evidential claim in two ways. First, results from an alternative, inde-
pendent test can be used as evidence for one or more assumptions behind
the primary evidential claim. Second, the result from a second test can func-
tion as ‘backup’ evidence in case one or more assumptions of the ﬁrst test
turn out to be false ð474Þ. Although our account addresses the direct evidential
support provided by congruent yet independent results, it is clearly com-
patible with the backup route, since useful backup evidence should be con-
ﬁrmationally independent—the main difference being that we are not com-
mitted to any epistemically relevant ordering of methods into primary and
secondary. Furthermore, our account does not rule out the possible relevance
of an additional congruent result for increasing the security of evidential
claims based on other methods.11 But when do congruent results provide
direct support and when do they increase security?
10. The failure of an auxiliary assumption falls within our notion of error.
11. Note that this is not inconsistent with the conﬁrmational independence condition, since
the condition is deﬁned in the ðidealizedÞ situation in which the hypothesis ðphenomenon
claimÞ is known to be true or false.
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Whether concordant results from independent tests conﬁrm the phenom-
enon hypothesis or increase our faith in the reliability of the methods depends
on ðiÞ the prior credibility of the result and ðiiÞ the prior assessment of the
reliability of the methods. The higher scientists’ knowledge of the methods
and their reliability, the more their convergence conﬁrms the result and vice
versa. If both the result and the methods are regarded to be highly unreliable,
possibly for similar reasons, scientists have no legitimate grounds to take
convergence to be evidence for the result. There is no reason to assume that
scientists ought to be testing either the reliability of inferences about phe-
nomena or the reliability of the procedures and not both ðFranklin 1986Þ.
However, this does not mean that the scientist chooses how to use the results
at hand: congruence of results does not come as a pie of conﬁrmation that the
scientist can apportion to alternative epistemic aims as she pleases.Moreover,
the congruence of results does not warrant a kind of bootstrapping inference,
that is, the use of the congruent results as grounds for inferring the reliability
of a method in order to further increase the credibility of the results.
We do not want, nor do we have space here, to engage Hudson’s his-
torical interpretation of Perrin’s argument as a case of ‘calibration’. We do,
however, want to comment on Hudson’s argument against the plausibility
of triangulation in general. Hudson’s main argument is the well-known one
that if none of the procedures by which the result is obtained are reliable,
then convergence of their results does not have any epistemic signiﬁcance
ðHudson 2013; see also Cartwright 1991Þ. In response, we simply reiterate
the point that we already made: this is simply false if we can reasonably
entertain degrees of support and if the conﬁrmational independence con-
dition holds ðat least approximatelyÞ. If triangulation is understood, as we
do, as a matter of controlling for the likely errors of diverse procedures, then
it is possible to identify the conditions under which the inferences are stronger.
In particular, as we have argued above, the more certain scientists are that the
procedures do not share the same kind of error or bias and that each procedure
is itself reliable to a degree, the stronger the inference to the existence of a
phenomenon will be.
5. Triangulation in Action: Neuroeconomics of Social Preferences. Our
discussion has so far remained at an abstract level. We now illustrate some of
our claims in the context of an ongoing debate involving economics, psy-
chology, anthropology, and neuroscience: the existence and causal role of
social preferences. Social preferences refer, albeit somewhat ambiguously,
to overt behavior, as well as sometimes to its underlying motivational states,
such that the agent takes into account ðeither positively or negativelyÞ the
material payoff or the well-being of others ðFehr and Krajbich 2014, 193Þ.
Such states are postulated to explain ubiquitous deviations from standard
microeconomic predictions of individual choice behavior in the laboratory, as
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well as in the ﬁeld. People donate to charity, share when they do not have to,
and punish those who act unjustly even when this is costly to themselves.
What exactly people are thought to care about varies from the well-being of
others ðaltruismÞ to overall fairness ðinequity aversionÞ. A set of standardized
game-theoretical experiments, such as the dictator game and the ultimatum
game, are interpreted to measure the strength of these motivations across a
wide range of cultural contexts.12 Although the idea of social preferences is
hardly counterintuitive, the stability and the very existence of these pref-
erences are still widely questioned.
Rival explanations for apparently pro-social behavior in the laboratory
include importation of mistaken social scripts and framings to one-off stra-
tegic interaction ðBinmore 2005Þ, pursuit of social esteem ðAndreoni and
Bernheim 2009Þ, and the motivation to play the game ‘correctly’ in the very
artiﬁcial experimental situation ðLevitt and List 2007Þ. In other words, these
alternative explanations point to the possibility that pro-social behavior is an
artifact of the experimental setup. In the case of observed pro-social behavior
in the wild, the alternative explanatory hypotheses are underdetermined by
the observational data. Furthermore, the within-subject stability of these pref-
erences across different games is relatively poor, which casts doubt on the
experiments’ ability to measure stable motivational features that could be
taken to explain pro-social behavior in the wild.
Accordingly, even though social preferences are very well documented
when interpreted purely behaviorally, their interpretation as motivations is
more contentious. In particular, the controversy is about whether they are
preferences to begin with ði.e., part of the goal-directed deliberate repertoire
of behaviorsÞ and, if they are preferences, whether they are truly other-
regarding rather than fundamentally selﬁsh.
In a recent review of the neuroscientiﬁc literature on social preferences,
Fehr and Krajbich claim that “one emerging theme of the studies reviewed is
that social reward activates circuitry that overlaps, to a surprising degree, with
circuitry that anticipates and represents other types of rewards. These studies
reinforce the idea that social preferences for donating money, rejecting unfair
offers, reciprocating others gifts, and punishing those who violate norms are
genuine expressions of preferences” ð2014, 214Þ. The idea is that by iden-
tifying the neural circuitry that is activated when individuals display pro-
social behavior, insights can be obtained into whether their motivations are
genuine expressions of social preferences. In this sense, neuroeconomics
12. In a dictator game, theﬁrst player ðproposerÞ simply decideswhether and howmuch to
give to the other player ðresponderÞ. Rational choice theory predicts, assuming self-
interest, that the proposer gives nothing and keeps all of the endowment. In an ultimatum
game, the responder has the option of denying the offer, in which case neither player gets
any money.
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experiments are regarded to contribute to purely behavioral experiments not
only in terms of providing mechanistic explanations ðCraver and Alexan-
drova 2008; Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2010Þ but also by providing additional
evidence that pro-social behavior is not an experimental artifact to begin with.
Woodward ð2009Þ argues that neural evidence can contribute to the trian-
gulation of social preferences, in particular regarding motives and prefer-
ences. For example, neural evidence might provide information about the
motivations underlying low rejections in ultimatum games: whether they in-
volve inequality aversion or a taste for negative reciprocity ð198Þ.
However, the use of neuroeconomics evidence for the triangulation of
social preferences faces three challenges. First, for successful triangulation
we need independent evidence, but is neural evidence on social preferences
suitably independent from behavioral evidence? Ross’s ð2008Þ complaint
that many neuroeconomics experiments simply replicate well-known experi-
mental games, with the only difference being that the subjects’ brain activity
is scanned, would seem to suggest that it is not. Second, it has been argued
that there are conceptual issues that make the neural evidence about behavior
hard to compare with more traditional economic evidence ðe.g., Fumagalli
2013, 336Þ. Third, much of the debate around neuroeconomics has concerned
its relevance to economic models and theories, which are about observable
choices and make no prediction about the brain ðe.g., Gul and Pesendorfer
2008; however, see Clarke 2014Þ. Therefore, it is unclear whether neural data
can be used as evidence for or against economic theories or models.
How does our account help to resolve these problems? Starting with the
last one, since triangulation pertains to inferences from data to phenomenon,
we do not need to worry about whether neural data can provide direct con-
ﬁrmation to economic theories and models. This is not to say that this is not an
interesting problem but only that our account of triangulation is silent on this
question.
The second issue pertains to the comparability of different kinds of evi-
dence. For example, Fumagalli ð2013, 336Þ notes that “profound conceptual
differences remain between a variable such as the ﬁring rate of some neu-
rons and an abstract construct like decision utility ðe.g. only the former is a
cardinal objectÞ.” But triangulation as we characterized it does not require a
tight conceptualmapping from the ontology of the evidence statements ðe.g.,
about brain activationÞ to the ontology of the theory to be tested ðe.g., de-
cision utilityÞ. This is because we conceive of triangulation as a species of
causal reasoning from data to a phenomenon, and what therefore sufﬁces are
the empirical principles of causal reasoning, especially when it comes to
reliability and error control. Hence, the issue of comparability turns into the
task of establishing whether diverse pieces of evidence are generated by the
intended common cause. For example, imaging data tracking such differ-
ences in affect-related areas ðanterior insula or anterior cingulate cortexÞ that
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correspond to differences in pro-social behavior ðe.g., whether the subject
engages in costly punishment of antisocial behaviorÞ are, or so the hypoth-
esis goes, caused by the affective states that partly constitute the social
preference for fairness. More generally, as was stated above, the credibility
of basic imaging techniques ðe.g., fMRIÞ as a means of producing data
relevant for cognitive and affective functions was not conclusively estab-
lished through a theoretical argument but by the experimental manipulation
of a surrogate system ða direct stimulation of a macaque brainÞ and a cor-
responding difference in the fMRI output.
The remaining problem concerns the independence of neuroeconomics
experiments vis-à-vis behavioral experiments. Obviously neuroeconomics
results based on the same kind of experimental games as the behavioral
experiments do not contribute much to claims about the pro-social behavior
in the lab. The crucial question then is whether they can be independent in a
way that increases the reliability of inferences about what drives such behav-
ior, asWoodward ð2009Þ suggests. That is to say, what we need to establish is
whether they share with behavioral experiments the same errors and biases
with respect to motivations. Clearly not all neuroeconomics experiments will
satisfy the required independence: if the affect driving the behavior in the
experiment is not really caused by perceived unfairness, but by some other
feature of the experimental setup, then the imaging data ðfMRI pictures of
affect-related activationÞ would likewise not be caused by social preferences
but instead would be an artifact of an experimental bias shared by the neu-
roeconomics and the behavioral experiments. In this case, the social prefer-
ence hypothesis would not screen off the behavioral and neuroimaging evi-
dence, because the results would be effects of the common error.
This does not mean, however, that neuroeconomics experiments can never
be independent in the right way. Independence can be achieved in several
ways, such as by varying the ðbehavioralÞ experimental protocol or by in-
creasing ðcausallyÞ independent sources of variation. Concerning the latter,
changing the subjects’ response to the intended social cue ðsuch as perceived
unfair playÞ by directly modulating the affective responses—for example, by
administering benzodiazepine ðGospic et al. 2011Þ or oxytocin ðBaumgartner
et al. 2008Þ to experimental subjects—reduces the chance that the observed
behavior is caused by something other than the intended cue ðsince it is hy-
pothesized to be mediated by affect-related motivational mechanismsÞ. Add-
ing further methods of data production, such as self-reporting, can provide
further suitably independent, triangulating grounds: it would be unlikely, al-
though certainly not impossible, for the subjects to report that they acted out of
anger toward apparently unfair play by the other players if in reality their be-
havior was caused by some other feature of the experiment ðsuch as pure
anxiety or frustration arising from the laboratory environmentÞ or from a mis-
taken, but fundamentally self-interested, learning strategy.
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Nevertheless, such independence will not always be sufﬁcient grounds
for an inference from diverse evidence to the truth of a general theory ðe.g.,
strong reciprocity theory vs. rational choice theoryÞ. It may still be the case
that the convergence between neuroeconomics experiments and behavioral
experiments increases conﬁdence in, for example, the existence of social
preferences as a robust laboratory phenomenon but that the kind of situa-
tions captured by one-shot games are never found in the wild ðWoodward
2009Þ or that social preferences do not in fact sustain pro-social behavior
where the general theory predicts they would ðGuala 2012Þ. More gener-
ally, even though diversity of evidence is sometimes cited as a powerful
argument in favor of a general theory based on social preferences, such as
strong reciprocity theory ðe.g., Camerer 2013; Fehr and Krajbich 2014Þ,
the argument that a theory’s ability to account for several ﬁndings speaks in
favor of its truth should be kept distinct from the robust determination of a
phenomenon frommultiple sources of data. Our account of triangulation does
precisely this.
6. Conclusion. We have argued that the intuitive idea of the epistemic gain
of variety of evidence works differently at the level of inferences from phe-
nomena to theory and from data to phenomena. We offered an account of
triangulation understood as a matter of controlling for error in causal inference
tomake claims about phenomena and addressed some of the skeptical critiques
leveled against triangulation. Applied to the causal data-to-phenomenon in-
ferences, the conﬁrmational independence condition captures the epistemic
value of triangulation, and this condition is realizedwhen the differentmethods
are reliability independent. Can we infer from convergent results obtained by
highly unreliable procedures the correctness of the result? Of course not. Nor
does employing a different procedure sufﬁce to ensure that every possible er-
ror has been eliminated. Nevertheless, these concerns should warn us against
conferring epistemic superpowers to triangulation, not lead us to conclude that
it is without merits. The philosophical task is to identify the conditions under
which a concordance of results supports rational increases in conﬁdence in
the result, as we have illustrated in the case of bringing neuroeconomics evi-
dence to triangulate on the existence and causal role of social preferences.
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